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Introduction 
There is a famous Chinese saying, according to which competition results in improvement
1
.  
Indeed, it is Chinese tradition to encourage competition in order to enhance innovation and 
improvement, especially using their intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) as drivers. However, there 
have been numerous reports on IPRs infringements by Chinese companies, leading to doubts on 
China’s ability to protect IPRs. Therefore, it is of primary importance to determine whether the new 
Anti-monopoly Law (“AML”) enacted in 2008
2
 and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”) Draft Guide on Anti-monopoly Law enforcement in the field of intellectual property rights 
2012
3
 (“Guide”) will help protect IPRs or rather deepen the problems. It is argued that the regime has 
worked successfully to provide better IPRs protection along with other intellectual property (“IP”) law 
regimes. However, it is also argued that there is room for improvement. Firstly, AML is inadequate in 
addressing the problems. Secondly, it lacks clarity in relation to Article 55 AML, thirdly, transparency 
in the relationship between AML and other applicable competition and IP laws, and fourthly, with the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IPRs
4
 (“TRIPS”). Fifthly, the Guide does not accord with the 
reality. Sixthly, the enforcement bodies lack guidance and experience in adjudication, and lastly, a 
clear division of labour in enforcement. Furthermore, China should continue to learn from various 
other international approaches well-established in the European Union and the United States
5
.  
 Part I of the essay will examine the present IPRs protection in China. In Part II, contrary to the 
myth that competition and IP law conflict with one another, it will be argued that both foster innovation 
and development, and enhance consumer welfare. The competition law regime in China will be 
discussed in Part III, with a specific focus on AML. The enforcement of the regime will be evaluated. 
Next, the E.U. approach will be discussed in Part IV, which China can consider adopting: the Block 
Exemptions approach from the E.U. on horizontal agreements, which will be discussed in Part V. 
It should be noted that despite of the fact that competition and IP law are related to many other 
aspects, at the very outset alternative methods of protecting IPRs and other Chinese competition-
related legislation will not be discussed. Furthermore, the essay will not engage in an economic nor 
trade-related approach in analysing the relationship between competition and IP law. 
 
I.  Present IPRs protection in China 
To Part A contains an overview of the present IPRs protection in China. IPRs infringement 
affects the Chinese and the world economy as a whole, which is the subject of discussion in Part B. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 In Chinese: “有競爭 才有進步” 
2
 Anti-monopoly Law 2008 
3
 SAIC Draft Guide on Anti-monopoly Law enforcement in the field of intellectual property rights 2012 
4
 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
5
 The author would like to thank Professor Valentine Korah and Professor Ioannis Lianos, Faculty of Laws, 
University College London and Professor Thomas Cheng, Faculty of Laws, University of Hong Kong for reviewing 
and offering unfailing guidance to the essay précis. 
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A. Overview 
IP law in China is of a high quality by global standards
6
. Both Chinese and foreign firms are 
granted same amount of cost and time in applying IPRs under Chinese law, comparable with the rest 
of the world
7
. The present IPRs protection in China has improved significantly compared with that a 
decade ago. As China increasingly interacts on a global level and is part of the World Trade 
Organisation (“WTO”), its laws have been constantly evolved to provide IPRs protection and attract 
further investment. IPRs protection was featured in the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015)
8
 with the 
pharmaceutical sector being one of the strategic industries that call for special attention. 
However, China is still infamous for counterfeits and piracy, and was even labelled as the “theft 
of American IP”, with branded goods, digital products, movies and music
9
, surpassing over US$1 
billion
10
. Chinese firms have a strong ability to mirror foreign technology. Many foreigners are also 
concerned with legal and political non-transparency (to be discussed in Part III), and restricted market 
access, caused by preferential treatment to Chinese companies in tax and finance
11
. Such local 
protectionism is likely due to official and public concern about potential foreign dominance over 
Chinese businesses and a strong desire to build up the latter
12
, which can be seen from the Chinese 
foreign investment policies of favouring foreign technology transfer to Chinese companies
13
. As a 
result, it is less common that the foreign party can defend successfully against IPRs infringement by a 
Chinese party, and rarely the opposite is true: in the Tsum-Sony
14
 case, Sony as the foreign party 
won. Lastly, the problem with abusive IP litigation is serious, with over 90% of all such cases between 
Chinese IPRs holders
15
. Thus, there is a strong and urgent call for better IPRs protection
16
 in China.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Ian Harvey (2011) Intellectual property: China in the global economy – myth and reality 
https://workspace.imperial.ac.uk/business-school/Public/research/I_Egroup/IPRC/IP_in_china_Ian_harvey.pdf  
(17
th
 July 2013) 
7
 ibid 
8
 The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011 – 2015), 11 March 2011 
9
 U.S. International Trade Commission China: effects of intellectual property infringement and indigenous 
innovation policies on the U.S. economy U.S. International Trade Commission 2011, 3-8 
10
 Xiantao Huang Patent: Strategy, management and litigation China, Beijing Shi 2008, 3 
11
 Reuters “EU business sees partial reversal of China reforms” Reuters New York 2
nd
 September 2009 (online 
version) 
12
 Alan Fels China’s Antimonopoly Law 2008: An Overview (2012) 41 Rev Ind Organ 7-30, 9 
13
 ibid 
14
 Tsum (Shanghai) Technology Co Ltd v. Sony Corporation (2004) Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court 
15
 H. Stephen Harris Jr., Peter J. Wang, Yizhe Zhang, Mark A. Cohen and Sebastien J. Evrard Anti-monopoly law 
and practice in China New York, Oxford University 2011, 250 
16
 Albert Guangzhou Hu Propensity to patent, competition and China's foreign patenting surge (2010) 39(7) 
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B. IPRs infringement impact 
To IPRs infringement has a huge impact on the economy in China and the world. Chinese 
companies’ innovations are stifled
17
 because of piracy. Many foreign investors will lose confidence in 
dealing with Chinese companies. The gains of a lower cost of production do not outweigh the losses, 
and most importantly, China has the unwanted label as a piracy country. Foreign firms such as some 
IP-intensive firms suffered losses of up to US$48 billion in 2009 and had spent approximately US$4.8 
billion to address the infringement problem
18
. These are in respect of reducing profits, increasing legal 
costs of taking legal action and defending against IPRs infringement, damaged brand name and 
product reputation
19
. Like in China, their innovation is stifled and competition is reduced. Consumers 
will have less choice and consumer welfare is hindered. Therefore, there is every reason to better 
enhance IPRs protection, such as through competition law. 
 
II.  Competition and IP law – in conflict or complementary? 
To many, competition and IP law appear to conflict with each other. In fact, they can be 
complementary and share similar policy goals e.g. encouraging innovation and development, and 
enhancing consumer welfare
20
. It is argued that competition law can help enhance IP protection. 
There are controversies about the conflicts between competition and IP law. On one hand, IP 
law grants IPR owners the exclusive right of exploit their IPRs. This entitles them to exclude others 
from copying or commercialising an invention that falls within the scope of their IPRs
21
. They can 
charge reasonable monopoly rates when others use or buy their IPRs and licenses to achieve 
exclusivity, and territorial and price restraints
22
. These rights are justified as IPR holders should, as a 
matter of public policy be entitled to recoup the substantial amount of time and effort invested in 
researching and developing their products and services
23
. On the other hand, unreasonable monopoly 
rates may trigger competition law sanctions. Indeed, competition law is concerned with curtailing 
market power exercised by firms (especially the dominant ones) which may prove harmful to 
consumer welfare
24
. With an enhanced level of competition, consumers benefit from lower prices and 
wider choices. Competition law is against monopoly, which IP law may create. This is especially true 
                                                          
17
 Jayanthi Iyengar “Intellectual property piracy rocks China boat” Asia Times China 16
th
 September 2004 (online 
version) 
18
 The statistics are from a survey in above 8, interviewing over 5,000 U.S. firms, conducted by an independent 
fact-finding federal agency. 
19
 ibid 
20
 Valentine Korah The interface between intellectual property rights and competition in developed countries 
(2005) 2:4 SCRIPTed 429 
21
 Angie Ng, Ding Liang and Peter Waters (2008) The intersect between intellectual property law and competition 
law – implications for China http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=IPBulletin081127-01 (17
th
 July 2013) 
22
 ibid 
23
 James F. Rill and Mark C. Schechter International anti-trust and intellectual property harmonization of the 
interface (2003) 34 Law and Policy International Business 783, 783  
24
 SCM Corp v. Xerox Corp. 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981) 
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for cumulative innovation
25
 when existing IPRs are supposed to encourage, not to hinder follow-on 
innovation.  
In fact, most conflicts between competition and IP laws stem from the uncertainties on, for 
instance, the extent of which competition policy on IPRs is about short-run efficiency aims, whether 
market power should be inferred from the existence of IPRs, and striking the balance on anti-
competitive restriction in the exercise of IPRs
26
.  
Both competition and IP law share the same policy goals of encouraging innovation and 
development, and enhancing consumer welfare
27
. Both competition and IP law aim to protect IPRs in 
order to facilitate innovation and encourage investment in researching and developing more new 
ideas. IP law, in particular, facilitates the commercialisation of innovation and encourages public 
disclosure when the IPR owner registers its IPR. Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to 
enter the marketplace
28
. Efficient production (static efficiency) and more innovative activity (dynamic 
efficiency) can be achieved with better consumer welfare.  
One author once stated that IP law is a carrot, whereas competition law is a stick
29
. Competition 
law recognises that an effective legal regime of IPRs is essential to a competitive economy, while IP 
law recognises the value of competition by limiting the life and breadth of IPRs
30
. In the Magill case
31
, 
it was held that the mere ownership of an IPR cannot automatically confer monopoly. IPRs may 
indeed confer a legal monopoly, depending on the existence of substitutes in the market
32
; but not 
necessarily an economic monopoly in competition law on the exercise of IPRs
33
.  
It is overly optimistic to expect that IP law can independently regulate the exercise of IPRs so 
comprehensively to meet competition objectives
34
. Nor should there be an over reliance on the 
                                                          
25
 Ioannis Lianos and Rochelle C. Dreyfuss New challenges in the interaction of intellectual property rights with 
competition law – a view from Europe and the United States Centre for Law, Economics and Society, Faculty of 
Law, University College London April 2013 
26
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Competition policy and intellectual 
property rights OECD 1997 
27
 Michael A. Carrier innovations for the 21
st
 century: harnessing the power of intellectual property and antitrust 
Law United Kingdom, Oxford University Press 2009 
28
 DOJ and FTC Antitrust enforcement and intellectual property rights: promoting innovation and competition DOJ 
and FTC U.S. 2007, 2 
29
 Ariel Ezrachi International research handbook on international competition law United Kingdom, Edward Elgar 
2012, 464 
30
 Ioannis Lianos A Regulatory theory of IP: Implications for competition law Centre for Law, Economics and 
Society, Faculty of Law, University College London, November 2008 
31
 Radio Telefis Eireann and Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission (1989) C241-91 
32
 Competition Commission of Singapore Competition Commission of Singapore Guidelines on the treatment of 
intellectual property rights Competition Commission of Singapore 2007, 4 
33
 Gustavo Ghidini Intellectual property and competition Law: the innovation nexus Edward Elgar United Kingdom 
2006, 109 
34
 Steven Anderman EC Competition law and intellectual property rights: the regulation of innovation Oxford 
Clanderon Press 1998, 17 
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competition law regime for the best IPRs protection. A proper balance should be maintained between 
the two. The analysis is particularly relevant to China as it is developing rapidly technologically
35
.  
 
III.  Competition law regime in China 
The competition law regime in China is relatively new. The focus of this paper will be on the AML 
which came into effect in 2008. AML is one of three statutes that protect competition in the Chinese 
markets
36
. Some scholars describe it as an economic constitution
37
. The AML aims to prevent and 
restrain monopolistic conduct, promote fair competition, enhance economic efficiency, safeguard 
consumer and social public interests
38
 and promote a healthy development of the socialist economy 
with Chinese characteristics
39
, thus protecting small and medium enterprises from larger competitors, 
in particular, foreign rivals
40
. The approach of the AML accords with other international approaches 
and reflects global concerns
41
. 
The legislative background of the AML is discussed in Part A. The AML and the evaluation of its 
enforcement are discussed in Parts B, C and D respectively. The position will be summarised in Part 
E. 
A. History 
As a result of China’s reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s, China’s efforts in 
promoting fair competition and cracking down on monopoly activities have been successful
42
. There 
are numerous provisions that regulate monopolistic conduct and restraints on competition, dispersed 
in various laws, regulations and administrative rules
43
. The earliest law on competition is the Interim 
Provisions for the Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy 1980, commonly 
referred to as the Ten Articles on Competition, which aims to combat monopolies
44
. The Chinese law 
continued to develop and there are currently three pieces of legislation related to competition. The 
first one is the AUCL, which prohibits 11 types of illegal conduct, including monopolistic conduct, such 
as abuse of dominant market position by public enterprises, predatory pricing, designated 
transactions by public utilities, tying, bid rigging and administrative monopoly, which is unique and 
                                                          
35
 Thomas Cheng “The Patent-Competition Interface in Asia: a regional approach” in above 39 
36
 The other two are the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 1993 (“AUCL”) and the Price Law 1998. 
37
 Paul Jones Licensing in China: the New Anti-monopoly Law, the abuse of IP rights and trade tensions (2008) 
XLIII(2) les Nouvelles: J. Licensing 106  
38
 Article 1 AML  
39
 The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1993  
40
 Nathan Bush The PRC Antimonopoly Law: unanswered questions and challenges ahead The Antitrust Law 
Group, American Bar Association U.S. 2007 
41
 Daniel Sarvin (2008) China’s Anti-monopoly will have a broad impact beyond notification 
http://www.martindale.com/business-law/article_Bingham-McCutchen-LLP_493958.htm  (17
th
 July 2013) 
42
 Nie Peng “China’s first Anti-monopoly Law takes effect” Xinhua News Agency 2
nd
 August 2008 (online version) 
43
 Consumer Protection Law 1993 and Bidding Law 1999 
44
 Promotion and Protection of Competition in the Socialist Economy 1980 
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common in China
45
. Secondly, the Price Law 1998, which is the price control law on cartels, predatory 
pricing and price discrimination
46
, and thirdly, the AML 2008. The enactment of the AML was put on 
the legislative agenda in 2004, passed in 2007 after 13 years of continuous development and three 
revisions, and implemented in 2008. 
Many Chinese lawmakers hoped that the AML would provide a solution to pressing 
competition problems, though not necessarily directed at IPRs
47
 but on mergers and acquisitions. 
Such issue was raised in a hostile takeover and IPR dispute case between a domestic Chinese 
beverage manufacturer Wahaha and the French food company Danone
48
. Wahaha was the target of 
a takeover bid by Danone, which simultaneously charged Wahaha for inappropriate use of its 
trademark. The chairman of Wahaha, Zong Qinghou, a member of the legislative body, the National 
People’s Congress (“NPC”), and another member, Li Guo-guang, in the NPC, also from the Legal 
Committee and the Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), called for a proposal to 
restrict foreign investment from monopolising various industries in China through mergers and 
acquisitions
 49
. Therefore, the AML was implemented with the hope to protecting fair competition in 
China in general. 
 
B. AML 
To Among the eight chapters and 57 articles in the AML, it prohibits four types of activities: 
monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominance
50
, concentration of undertakings
51
 and abuse of 
administrative power to eliminate or restrain competition
52
. Monopolistic conduct both within the 
territory and those outside are subject to AML scrutiny
53
. Only actions conducted by agricultural 
producers and rural economic organisations are excluded from the operation of the AML
54
. The main 
articles which will be discussed below are Articles 13, 14, 17 and 55
55
.  
Articles 13 and 14 are about anti-competitive monopoly agreements. Article 13 prohibits 
horizontal agreements that fix the prices, limit the output or sales, divide the sale market or raw 
                                                          
45
 Pate R. Hewitt What I heard in the great hall of people – realistic expectations of Chinese antitrust (2008-2009) 
75 Antitrust L. J. 195 
46
 Shang Ming Antitrust in China – a constantly evolving subject (February 2009) Competition Law International 4 
– 11, 4 
47
 Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wm. Wolff, Rachel Howe and Diana Oh China’s new Anti-monopoly Law: a 
perspective from the United States (2009) 18(1) Pacific Rim L Poly J 53, 62 
48
 Lan Xinzhen “Wahaha vs. Danone” Beijing Review China 7
th
 June 2007 (online version)  
49
 Zong Qinghou “Proposal on legislation restricting foreign investment from monopolizing various industries in 
China through mergers and acquisitions and maintaining economic security” Xinhua Net China 14
th
 March 2007 
(online version)  
50
 Article 3 AML  
51
 Article 19 AML 
52
 Article 32 AML  
53
 Article 2 AML  
54
 Article 56 AML 
55
 Abuse of administrative power will not be discussed. 
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material procurement market, limit the purchase of new technologies or new facilities or limit the 
development of new products or new technologies, engage in boycott transactions and other 
prohibitions
56
. The Judicial Interpretation on Adjudication of Technology Contracts in 2005 declares 
that restrictions on the acquisition of competing technology or development can be considered as 
"illegal monopoly of technology"
57
. Similarly, Article 14 prohibits vertical agreements that fix the prices 
for resale, restrict minimum price for resale and other prohibitions
58
. There are exemptions in Article 
15 for the application of Articles 13 and 14, such as if the agreements enables the consumer to share 
the benefits derived from the agreement and will not severely restrict competition, and either improve 
technology or research and develop new products, upgrade product quality, reduce cost, improve 
efficiency, unify product specifications and standards, carry out professional labour division, improve 
operational efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium sized entities, serve the 
public welfare, such as conserving energy, protecting the environment and providing disaster relief, 
mitigate serious sale decreases or excessive production during economic recessions, safeguard 
justifiable trade interests and economic cooperation, or other circumstances stipulated by law and the 
State Council
59
. 
Article 17 is about abuse of market dominance
60
. It prohibits those with dominant market 
position from without justifiable cause engaging in predatory pricing, refusing to trade, allowing 
exclusive dealing or tying. Article 18 further explains that there are a number of factors to determine 
the finding of a dominant market position for a business operator
61
, such as its market share, its 
capacity to control the markets, its financial and technical conditions, the degree of dependence of 
other business operators and the degree of difficulty to enter the market
62
. Article 19 then stipulates 
the dominant market share threshold required
63
: 50% for one business operator, two of them: 66.7% 
and three of them: 75%.  
Article 55, which is under the chapter on Supplementary Provisions, is particularly related to 
IPRs. It states that:  
“This Law does not govern the conduct of business operators to exercise their 
intellectual property rights under laws and relevant administrative regulations on 
intellectual property rights; however, business operators'' conduct to eliminate or restrict 
market competition by abusing their intellectual property rights shall be governed by this 
Law.”
 64
 (Emphasis added) 
 
                                                          
56
 Article 13 AML 
57
 Judicial Interpretation on Adjudication of Technology Contracts 2005 
58
 Article 14 AML 
59
 Article 15 AML 
60
 Article 17 AML 
61
 In this context, the phrases “business operators” and “IPR owners” will be used interchangeably as they refer 
to the same type of people in the AML. 
62
 Article 18 AML 
63
 Above 61 
64
 Article 55 AML 
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The first half of Article 55 sets out an exemption from the application of the AML, which IPR 
owners are not subject to such scrutiny for merely exercising their IPRs consistent with the laws and 
relevant administrative regulations on IPRs. The exemption is however, conditional
65
. The second half 
sets out the condition: if they engage in any conduct that seeks to eliminate or restrict market 
competition by abusing their IPRs, then, the AML shall apply. The plaintiff or the compliant bears the 
burden of proof to determine whether the alleged conduct violates specific provisions of the AML. 
When the defendant has recourse to the first half of Article 55 as a defense, the complainant must 
then prove the defense is not available by relying on the second half, that the conduct constitutes an 
IP abuse with anti-competitive effects
66
. A balancing analysis will be taken to see if pro-competitive 
effects are created by restraining the exercise of IPRs and whether such outweigh the anti-
competitive effects caused by the defendant’s activities before the defense is effective.  
There are mainly two enforcement bodies to the AML and other competition laws: the Anti-
monopoly Commission (“AMC”), and three Anti-monopoly Enforcement Agencies (“AMEAs”)
67
. Firstly, 
the Price Supervision and Antimonopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform 
Commission (“NDRC”) enforces against prohibition on abuse of administrative power in price-related 
matters. Secondly, the Anti-monopoly and Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC) enforces 
against the same but on non-price related matters. Lastly, the Antimonopoly Bureau of the Ministry of 
Commerce (“MOFCOM”) administers and conducts merger reviews. These agencies are also 
respectively responsible for determining whether IPRs should be granted in the first place. On the 
judicial aspect, the IP tribunal of the Intermediate People's Courts hears civil cases relating to 
competition, with the same jurisdiction by the SPC, regardless of whether these disputes are IP 
related or not
68
. 
 There are also leniency programs that play an important role in investigating and sanctioning 
monopoly agreements
69
. Whistle-blowers can report to the AMEAs but often this would have stirred 
suspicion among business partners. This is special and unique in the AML regime compared with 
other international approaches. 
 
C. Enforcement 
The enforcement of the AML by the AMC and the AMEAs has been a success. More officials 
were employed to intensify the enforcement efforts. Until 2012, the NDRC had investigated 49 price-
monopoly cases, few involving abuse of dominance, and 20 of them were closed with administrative 
penalties
70
. The SAIC had investigated 17 cases: 16 on cartels
71
 and 1 on abuse of dominance with 
administrative penalties in 6 cases. The MOFCOM had accepted 186 notifications of concentration 
                                                          
65
 ibid 
66
 Susan Ning (2009) Antitrust litigation in China http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=antitrust-litigation-
in-china-03-china-bulletin-2009&language=en  (17
th
 July 2013) 
67
 ibid 
68
 SPC Provisions on the Cause of Action of Civil Cases 2011 
69
 Above 46, 7 
70
 Susan Ning, Hazel Yin and Yunlong Zhang (2013) The Anti-monopoly Law of China: what we have seen in 
2012? http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2013/02/articles/corporate/antitrust-competition/the-anti-monopoly-law-of-
china-what-we-have-seen-in-2012/  (17
th
 July 2013) 
71
 Cases involve big foreign companies such as Samsung, LG, etc. 
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cases
72
, approved 142 of them and 16 with conditions. The SPC had then selected 34 typical 
competition and IP cases from 2012
73
, and summarised them with issues on the application of the 
laws that can have universal significance. It had also issued a judicial interpretation relating to the 
court procedures to be followed in the AML in 2009
74
. 
 A Draft Guide on competition enforcement involving IPRs
75
 was published after four years of 
collaborative effort of the AMEAs, the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), comments from the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in the U.S.
76
. There were 
also voluntary submissions from foreign and domestic firms, trade associations, private practitioners 
and scholars
77
. The Guide is not binding but has been successfully used as guidance.  
Just like other international approaches and the discussion in Part II, business operators with 
IPRs will not be automatically deemed to be enjoying dominant market power, under the safe harbour 
mechanism in Article 19 AML
78
. When analysing monopoly behaviours, the SAIC for instance, will 
define the relevant market and determine the market position, analyse the nature and manifestation of 
the exercise of the IPR on competition and the relationship between the operators in the market
79
. 
The restriction on competition caused by the monopolistic conduct must exceed that of a normal 
exercise of IPRs before the SAIC takes action
80
. Also, the AMEAs will not investigate a unilateral, 
unconditional or non-discriminative refusal to license, but those that are obviously unfair and 
discriminative, without justification or as a means of enforcing other restrictive terms or tying 
arrangements
81
.  
The AMEAs have specific enforcement focuses. Abuses of IPRs were specifically mentioned in 
the National Patent Development Strategy as an area that calls for attention
82
. The SAIC for instance, 
focuses on monopoly conducts of public utility enterprises, such as electricity, water and gas 
suppliers, typical antitrust cases that cause serious impact on market competition, industrial 
monopolies and regional blockades
83
.  
                                                          
72
 One of the cases is the Huiyuan Juice acquisition by Coca-Cola, rejected by MOFCOM in 2009.  
73
 SPC SPC Annual report of intellectual property cases SPC 2012 
74
 SPC Action Plan for Intellectual Property Protection 2009 
75
 The Guide 
76
 Susan Ning and Hazel Yin (2012) China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: retrospect and prospect on the fourth 
anniversary http://www.kingandwood.com/Bulletin/ChinaBulletinContent.aspx?id=6a3d8f71-d16d-4c1d-b3d0-
b251d881e617  (17
th
 July 2013) 
77
 Richean Li The Chinese State Administration of Industry and Commerce makes another attempt to define 
anticompetitive exercise of intellectual property rights (August 2012) Competition Law Centre 
78
 Above 51 
79
 Above 77 
80
 Dexian v. Sony (2004) Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court  
81
 Article 17, the Guide 
82
 National Patent Development Strategy 2000, Chapter IV (1) 
83
 Susan Ning, Sun Yiming and Kate Peng (2012) Chinese antitrust regulators vow to increase transparency 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/193012/Cartels+Monopolies/Chinese+Antitrust+Regulators+Vow+to+Increase+Transp
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 July 2013) 
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On standard setting and development, there are no standard settings in China. Such standards 
are set by the State on a compulsory or voluntary basis, outside the AML framework
84
. There are 
concerns that standard settings or technology pools can create negative effects on competition, when 
they prohibit licensors from granting licenses outside of joint business operation, insert no-challenge 
and non-competition clauses in the agreement, charge exhaustive rates and demand grant-backs
85
, 
with no justifiable reason. Neither are there published guidelines by the AMEAs for the operation of 
standard-setting bodies (“SSOs”), patent pools or licensing, providing IPR holders with assurance that 
their standard setting activities would definitely not be subject to the AML
86
. However, the Guide 
clarifies that the acts of managing the joint business operation will not be automatically reviewed
87
, 
except when the acts constitute discrimination against other participants, restricting them from using 
the patents
88
. If the IPR holder participates in the standard setting and development but fails to 
disclose the IPR during the development process and its conduct has been monopolistic, its IPR 
claims will not be enforced
89
. An AMEA may impose a license on a reasonable and non-discriminatory 
basis as sanction. Scrutiny will increase further if the market position of the operator is more dominant 
and they unreasonably restrict the establishment of substitute operations
90
. Moreover, the Guide also 
suggests prohibiting agreements that fix patent royalties between competing business operators
91
. 
But it fails to understand that it has been the practice in China for operators to determine royalties 
among themselves. It remains to be seen how the law around SSOs will develop, as the AMEAs are 
very unlikely to intrude into the State’s domain. 
On the issue of the enforcement powers of the AMEAs and the courts, apart from administrative 
penalties, the Measures for Compulsory Patent Licensing issued by the SIPO in 2011 states that 
neither the AMEAs nor the courts will have the power to grant compulsory patent licenses to remedy 
violations of the AML
92
. Instead, such orders would be granted at the discretion of the State Council’s 
Patent Administration Department, upon review by the NDRC or the SAIC, coupled with the 
application by the concerned party
93
. 
The NDRC has also held many seminars with the E.U. and other countries to provide training for 
enforcement staff and even sent officials to learn in the E.U. on its anti-monopoly laws and 
enforcement work
94
. On that note, the enforcement of the competition law regime, in particular the 
AML is evaluated below. 
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D. Enforcement evaluation 
The AML has been implemented quite successfully over the past 5 years. However, most of the 
successes are not directly related to IPRs. There are certain aspects on implementing and enforcing 
the AML that had drawn attention for Chinese lawmakers for future amendments and improvements, 
such as 1) the inadequacy of AML itself, 2) lack of clarity in Article 55; call for transparency because 
of the 3) unclear relationship of AML with other applicable competition and IP laws, 4) that unclear 
relationship between Article 55 and the TRIPS, 5) the Guide not matching with the reality; 6) lack of 
experience and guidance in adjudication of competition law cases, and lastly, 7) the unclear balance 
of power between the three AMEAs. 
1. Inadequacy of AML 
The AML is not adequate in addressing the competition law problems facing China today. For 
instance, the exemptions under Article 15 may offer some protection for IPR holders, but very often 
they find it difficult to satisfy the burden of proof for the conditions required, such as consumer 
benefiting from the agreement
95
. Also, by permitting the most common types of cartel agreements, 
Article 15 actually significantly weakens the pro-competitive purpose of the AML
96
. Similarly, by 
requiring similar favourable licenses to be granted to other firms in the market once the license is 
granted to the original licensee, the AML may have created a compulsory IP licensing system
97
, which 
discourages innovation rather than encouraging
98
.  
Certain provisions of the AML related to the dominant position are vague and require further 
clarification. Such dominance can be achieved with a market share as low as 10%
99
 in the cases 
decided
100
, while Article 19 AML specifically states that such market share shall not be presumed as 
dominance and in the Guide, 20%
101
. Also, the approach which presumes dominant position of 
multiple entities based on their combined market share is worrying
102
. It appears that entities with low 
market concentration will be punished because there are not a lot of market participants. There is no 
guidance as to what suffice for them to rebut the presumption
103
. Moreover, the AML does not seek to 
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distinguish between IPR holders who are competitors in the area of the IPR license and those who 
compete outside
104
.  
From the statistics, there are too few successful cases of enforcing against violations under the 
AML. Although the Dexian v. Sony case
105
 is decided on the AUCL before AML had commenced, the 
issue is whether Sony had abused its IPRs by tying
106
 which AML can be applicable as well. Sony’s 
insistence on using its patented replacement battery was held not to be an abuse of IPR; even though 
prima facie it was dominant over the digital market. There was no evidence of unnecessary 
technological strategies. SAIC is the AMEA for both laws, so it is likely that it will give the same or 
similar interpretation to the AML as that in the AUCL. In Shanda v. Sursen
107
, it was decided that the 
AML was not violated either. The case is about an unauthorized adaptation of an online novel by two 
avid fans who were disappointed by the ending. They decided to write an unauthorized sequel to it 
using the same characters, and published it online which became highly successful. They alleged 
Shanda to have abused the IPR while they had actually infringed the copyrights of the novel. These 
cases reflect that AML may be useless in enforcement as the threshold for any competition violation is 
too high. The AMEAs may have taken an overly-cautious approach, which made the enforcement 
weak. 
Lastly, it is unclear whether the AML has a retrospective or prospective effect as it is silent on 
the issue. AML is thus inadequate to solve the competition problems. 
 begin 
2. Lack of clarity in Article 55 AML 
The language adopted in AML is very general, including Article 55. Certain key terms are not 
defined, such as to what constitutes to eliminating or restricting market competition, IPRs, or the 
abuse of IPRs
108
. It is unclear whether Chinese medicine, genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
can be part of an IPR
109
. There are almost no cases until present for the AMEAs to interpret the 
terms
110
. Currently, among the three AMEAs, only MOFCOM publishes all its decisions of prohibition 
or conditional approval
111
. Arguably, maximum flexibility is given to the AMEAs to interpret the AML on 
their own
112
 and if that does not work, they can always seek for judicial interpretation from the SPC or 
the State Council, which is a standard Chinese legislative practice. Companies, especially foreign 
ones, would have no idea whether their conduct has the potential to violate the AML. 
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Questions have also been raised about the relationship between Article 55 and the general 
prohibitions under AML, as Article 55 is put under the Supplementary Provisions
113
 at the end of the 
AML. Only Article 55 is particularly addressed to IPRs, which is significantly less compared with other 
international regimes. Some practitioners and academics therefore view IPRs as an exception to the 
application of the AML, implying that IP laws are considered to be equivalent in status to the AML, 
with a safe harbour for IPR holders to exercise their IPRs legitimately. Others argue that AML should 
be strictly applied to all cases where IPRs are involved
114
. It is now clarified by the Legislative Affairs 
Commission of the Standing Committee of NPC that competition law does not apply to all IP aspects 
but only when the circumstances required are met
115
. Such however, is not accepted in the E.U. 
approach
116
. By categorising Article 55 as a supplementary provision, AML lowers Article 55’s status 
and affects how it connects with the rest of the AML provisions. 
Another concern is whether Article 55 extends the prohibition on abuse of dominant position to 
activities carried out by non-dominant IPR holders
117
. If so, non-dominant IPR holders will be unable 
to engage in certain potentially abusive activities. The market share threshold test for the abuse of 
dominance in Article 19 AML will be irrelevant
118
. Also, it remains unclear as to whether dominant 
entities exercising IPRs are subject to the same competition scrutiny as dominant entities selling other 
goods or services, as IP indeed differs from other types of property
119
. Article 55 therefore requires 
further clarification. 
3. Unclear relationship between AML and other applicable competition and IP laws 
The AML does not explicitly repeal but coexists with many existing applicable Chinese 
competition and IP laws and regulations, such as those mentioned in Parts A and B above. Based on 
the general principles of hierarchy
120
, AML as the more recent economy-wide legislation take 
precedence over previous laws and regulations in cases of conflict, but to the extent they do not 
contradict it, they may apply concurrently
121
.  
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It remains true that Chinese competition and IP laws are fragmented, confined in scope and 
rarely enforced
122
. The problem with dual application is that some laws and regulations differ 
significantly with AML, for instance, in the amount of penalties for tying, bid rigging and price 
controls
123
. The Patent Law 1998 was silent on any IPR abuse while Article 55 AML provides so. 
Despite the revised Patent Law in 2008 to cater for compulsory licensing
124
, so to harmonise it with 
the AML, it remains unclear if an infringement under the Patent Law will be subject to both itself and 
AML. Thus, further clarifications are necessary as IPR owners, in particular the foreign ones, are 
uncertain about the legal implications behind all the relevant competition and IP laws. 
4. Unclear relationship between Article 55 AML and TRIPS 
To There were concerns that Article 55 AML will have violated Article 40 TRIPS. Article 40 
TRIPS provides that China may adopt appropriate measures to prevent or control abuse of IPRs 
consistently with other provisions of the TRIPs
125
. China acceded to the WTO in 2001 and has an 
obligation to comply with all WTO agreements, including the TRIPS
126
. Some states had expressed 
concern as to the compatibility of the phrase “abuse of IPRs” in Article 55 AML as it seems to go 
beyond what TRIPS considers as abusive practices under Article 31(k)
127
 for compulsory licensing
128
. 
However, the Chinese representatives assured that Article 55 had not breached the TRIPS and the 
AML is fully compatible. Any further development on the issue remains to be seen. 
5. Unrealistic Guide 
Although the Guide has been useful in many ways in assisting the understanding and 
enforcement of the AML, in many other ways it is somehow unrealistic. Article 11 illustrates certain 
types of competitive activities, including cross-licensing
129
, without however realising the market 
reality that cross-licensing can also produce pro-competitive effects, such as reducing the risk of IPR 
infringements, saving monitoring costs and focusing on innovation
130
. The Guide also provides that a 
dominant company may not impose unreasonable transactional conditions involving IPRs without 
justifiable reasons. Prima facie, this prohibition would appear to ban a wide category of provisions that 
are however routinely included in IPRs and settlement agreements, such as the use of a no-challenge 
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clause
131
. The European Commission (“E.C.”) has examined the issue in the Pharmaceutical sector 
Inquiry, but it has not made an infringement decision on that clause
132
. It remains unclear whether 
E.C. will comment further for the Guide to reflect more of the market reality. 
Article 17 of the Guide dealing with refusal of license states that AMEAs will not impose a duty to deal 
with competitors or other parties upon an IPR, but added that the unilateral refusal to license must be 
unconditional and non-discriminatory
133
. This will mean that the IPRs holder will only be safe from 
competition violation if he licenses to everyone or to none, or he will be taking the risks of being 
challenged by the AMEAs
134
. This is absurd to the original purpose of the AML. Moreover, the Guide 
does not explain why individual assessments are taken applicable to all operators, when there should 
be no such requirements for non-dominant operators
135
. So the usefulness of the Guide remains to be 
improved. 
6. Lack of experience and guidance in adjudication 
The specialised delegation of the jurisdiction to the IP tribunals may mean that the tribunals 
have better capacity to deal with the IP abuse cases. But equally they are not better equipped in 
dealing with competition law issues that are new to them. Sometimes, the courts had not even 
referred to the matter to the IP tribunal. In Sursen v. Shanda and Xuanting, the regular court ruled on 
the matter without delegating jurisdiction to the IP tribunal
136
, but the parties did not challenge the 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the jurisprudence and capability of economic analysis on competition law in China 
are still in development
137
. Judges have limited training to understand the issues. There are no or 
limited precedents for the AMEAs and the judges to follow. The work of the AMEAs is rarely disclosed 
and the public always question about the reliability of their decisions, causing distrust among them
138
. 
Such is reflected in NDRC’s decision on agreeing with an early settlement with China Telecom and 
China Unicom instead of imposing fines on them, which are state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”). The 
preparation of further interpretations or advice is likely to involve not just the AMEAs but also other 
enforcement bodies
139
. That means that delays are resulted in publishing the guidance. At the end, it 
relies on the bodies themselves to implement the laws
140
. It is useless if they do not. 
Foreign business investors are often worried that the AML will be used abusively against them 
while the enforcement bodies and the judiciary turn a blind eye on the domestic and SOEs
141
. They 
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are concerned that the AML will be used as a defense to avoid or delay infringement actions involving 
Chinese parties, as the anti-monopoly investigation process once initiated is very time-consuming
142
. 
As discussed, Chinese officials often claim that China is plagued with foreign technology businesses 
that use unfair competition tactics
143
. Under local protectionism, judges tend to be biased in favour of 
the SOEs, supported by local committees or local people’s congresses
144
. The authorities are unlikely 
to offend them because of the pressure that they would lose the tenures, benefits or even be removed 
for a verdict that the local government is not pleased with
145
. Additionally, local courts may suffer from 
significant funding reductions if they do not take government interests (which are about SOEs) 
seriously
146
. This lack of independence has a significant impact on the prosecution of pharmaceutical 
counterfeiters especially. Therefore, many companies, foreign and local, call for a shift in the 
enforcement focus to the SOEs as they are likely to abuse their administrative power to achieve 
dominance. Same standards should be adopted for both domestic and foreign businesses. 
7. Unclear division of labour among three AMEAs 
Lastly, the enforcement aspect of the AML in relation to IPRs is weak
147
. Firstly, it is due to the 
unclear division of labour among the three AMEAs. The AMC does not have substantive enforcement 
powers but formulates competition policies and guidelines, evaluates competition conditions, 
coordinates enforcement activities and reports back to the State Council
148
. The AMEAs on the other 
hand, have strong powers
149
, including the power to inspect and investigate business and non-
business premises, and seize relevant evidence without a court order. However, the AML does not 
detail the structure of the AMEAs
150
. All three AMEAs have been struggling for more power. Despite 
the seemingly clear division of responsibilities as discussed, the NDRC had once issued notice with 
respect of a case while the SAIC should have been the best candidate to decide. It was a case on the 
tying of wholesale of table salt with detergent washing powder
151
. Clearly it is a non-pricing practice 
which SAIC has the power to decide. 
Each of the AMEAs, such as the NDRC and the SAIC had implemented rules respectively on 
the implementation of the AML
152
. But the level of detail in the rules is limited. However, they were not 
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deterred in enforcing what they consider to be relatively obvious anti-competitive domestic horizontal 
cartel activities, which have been the main focus of enforcement in other laws before the AML 
commenced. In relation to other types of agreements, this means that there is ongoing uncertainty as 
to which agreements can or will be challenged under the AML
153
.  
Secondly, the weak enforcement is because of the complex government structure. On a higher 
policy level, there are five levels of government and more than a dozen other governmental 
departments called “competition liaison agencies” across the geographical spread
154
, such as sector 
regulators, financial regulators and even the police and national security agencies. There are 
problems of allocation of enforcement responsibilities among the three AMEAs and other enforcement 
bodies with jurisdiction potentially overlapping and conflicting with each other
155
. The lack of clarity on 
legal enforcement in general has been an institutional problem in China which hinders the efficiency 
and effectiveness of law enforcement as a whole
156
. Due to the influx of parties seeking to obtain 
IPRs, the AMEAs had allocated a significant portion of their budgets and personnel to reviewing the 
IPRs applications. There were limited resources left to handle the investigation and adjudication of 
IPR infringement claims
157
. The complex division of labour among the AMEAs has worsened the 
competition enforcement and this has to be changed. 
 
E. Summary 
In summary, the implementation of the AML over the 5 years was sparingly successful. AML 
needs clarity and guidance for the application of the articles, especially on Article 55; transparency as 
to how different competition and IP laws and rules, such as the TRIPs interact with the AML and a 
better enforcement mechanism among the AMEAs and other enforcement bodies. The enforcement 
should aim more at the SOEs rather than foreign businesses. The NDRC and the SAIC had stated in 
August 2012 that they would increase transparency of their enforcement actions under the AML
158
. 
Some basic information of the investigation would be stated clearly to the public, such as what 
procedures to follow in order to apply for leniency, when the business operator under investigation will 
be notified, and how fines are calculated and determined. It remains to be seen that a single agency, 
fair and independent
159
, will be established to be responsible for the enforcement and implementation 
of both the AML and other competition laws
160
. Alternatively, specific guidelines on the division of 
labour among the AMEAs and other enforcement bodies will be available if the current model is kept. 
Conflicts between them can be reduced and capacity-building within each of them can be enforced. 
Lastly, a specific IP and competition piece of legislation may be desirable, instead of relying on Article 
55 AML only, combining various applicable laws and regulations and with a clearer structure. 
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Gerald F. Mosoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Anti-trust division of DOJ in the 
U.S. commented that the Chinese government has indeed demonstrated its openness to the ideas 
and experiences of competition law enforcers worldwide in the enforcement of the competition law 
regime
161
. Definitely China can look into more of the established approaches in the E.U., to improve 
on the existing regime, especially on the application of the AML. China should also continue to 
increase the reward to foreign investors and induce more innovation
162
.   
 
IV.  Comparison with the E.U. approaches 
Different international approaches vary in the degree of seriousness with which competition laws 
are enforced and the right institutional approach to competition protection and whether it is best done 
administratively or judicially
163
. Note however that there is still no consensus as to the definition of 
some key elements, such as “competition” and “anti-competitive”. Chinese AMEAs can draw on 
lessons from countries with well-established regimes with more advanced IP and competition laws, 
such as the E.U. The two approaches have been well-established for many years and are models for 
many competition law regimes in the world. Most importantly, China can learn from the success as 
well as avoiding the wrong turns they had made. But it is equally important to understand how the 
regimes deal with the interrelation between IPRs protection and competition law enforcement. The 
different political and cultural beliefs behind the regimes inevitably lead to different answers in dealing 
with IPRs enforcement, not just because they ascribe to different schools of economic thought
164
.   
E.U.  
The E.U. is an established regime and is mostly laid out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union
165
 (“TFEU”). It prohibits anti-competitive agreements
166
, abuses of dominant 
position
167
 and patent misuse, and governs SSOs. The AML finds many resemblances to the TFEU. 
The general prohibitions of AML such as Articles 13 to 16 reflect Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 
101 prohibits agreements to restrict prices when licensee sells goods to third parties, impose no-
challenge clauses, prohibit licensee from supplying from anyone, restrict reselling to certain types of 
customers, and impose exclusive grant-backs or assignment-back obligations
168
. Article 102 
describes four ways of a dominant position: tying, refusal to license, unfair pricing and excessive 
pricing
169
. Standard-setting may raise particular competition concerns, such as a patent ambush
170
, 
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where the patent holder fails to inform a SSO about the relevant patent, similar to the suggestion in 
the Guide. Other examples include an inadequate standardization process with standard-setting 
procedures that are not sufficiently open and transparent, compulsory licensing and standards 
manipulation. But as discussed, there are no such equivalent provisions in the AML.  
The AML is very similar to the TFEU. Articles 17 to 19 AML are similar to Article 102 TFEU, and 
the pre-merger notifications are similar to that in Articles 86 and 87 TFEU respectively. Both the E.U. 
approach and AML has no criminal liability system for violation of the laws but rely on fines. The 
presumption of dominance is 50%
171
, which is higher than that in Article 19 AML. The burden of proof 
lies similarly on the claimant or the enforcement authority
172
. Again, there is no equivalent Article 55 in 
the TFEU
173
. 
The Guide resembles the four-prong test from the E.U. approach: firstly, the agreement must 
contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or promoting technical or economic 
progress; secondly, the restrictive conduct must be indispensable to achieve the efficiency; thirdly, 
that efficiency must be shared with consumers; and lastly, the restrictive conduct will not severely 
impede competition in the relevant market
174
. But requiring a dominant firm to grant access to its 
essential IPR under Article 18 of the Guide
175
 is a departure from the IMS Health case
176
, as it is not 
only about the secondary market as stated in the case, but the market at the same level as in the 
Guide. Plus, the Guide does not stress the preclusion of a new product and objective justification 
elements while listed in Article 15 AML
177
, thus expanding the essential facility doctrine improperly 
and opening potential floodgates for more IPR infringements. Although China is in no way bound to 
follow E.U. law, some insight may continue to be gained by learning from the E.U. approach
178
.   
 
V.  Lessons for China 
To As the Chinese saying goes, it is best to learn from everyone and gather the wisdom
179
. 
Mindful of China’s specific social and economic circumstances rather than uncritically importing 
legislative models from other approaches
180
, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach for China. It is 
argued that China can certainly learn from the Block Exemptions approach adopted by the E.U. for 
horizontal agreements. 
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Block Exemptions from the E.U. approach 
Similar to Article 15 AML and Article 12 of the Guide with a list of the safe harbour rules, the 
Block Exemptions from the E.U. approach are highly suitable for AML to adopt, in particular, the 2004 
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation
181
 (“TTBER”) for technology transfer. As well, other 
specialisation agreements on unilateral and reciprocal specialisation, and joint production are suitable 
for China
182
. These are attempts to exclude the application of Article 101(1) TFEU
183
. The TTBER 
prohibits exclusive grant-back obligations of a licensee’s own severable improvements, no-challenge 
clauses and restrictions on the licensee’s ability to exploit its own technology or on its ability to 
develop new technology where the license is granted to a non-competitor
184
. It is very detailed in 
contrast with the Guide. It aims to strike a delicate balance between granting rights broad enough to 
create incentives for innovation, but at the same time not so broad as to hamper further improvements 
for competitors
185
. It allows firms to formulate their licensing agreements according to their 
commercial and business needs
186
. But TTBER only applies to bilateral agreements at present. It 
should include more IP-related agreements that can affect competition law
187
, which China may 
consider expanding its scope to cover the above deficiencies and to multi-party licensing agreements 
as well. Note however that the market share threshold combined in the TTBER is 20%
188
, not 10%. It 
remains a problem for China to keep such a low threshold. 
Conclusion 
It has been a longstanding debate as to how to “marry the innovation bride and the competition 
groom”
189
 in China. The competition law regime in China in particular with the AML had implemented 
quite efficiently to provide IPRs protection, alongside with other competition and IP regimes. Still, the 
regime is relatively young and there are many areas of improvement, on improving clarity, 
transparency with other laws, including the TRIPS and better enforcement structure. China should 
continue to learn from the approaches taken by developed regimes in the E.U.. As the economic 
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reform in China deepens, the breadth and depth of law enforcement will get better, which is highly 
desirable
190
. 
As the former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao once said, the competition of the world’s future, 
including China, is the competition in IP
191
. There is hope for China’s AML and the competition law 
regime to develop for better IPRs protection and keep up with the traditional Chinese culture of 
encouraging innovation and improvement throughout. 
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